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1 Preliminaries on Complexity and Policy
There is one main theme and correspondingly, one formal result in this paper.
On the basis of a general characterization of what is formally meant by a com-
plex economy, underpinned by imaginative suggestions to this end in Foley (
[6]) and in Brock and Colander ([3], henceforth BC), it will be shown that an
e¤ective1 theory of economic policy is impossible for such an economy. There is,
in addition, also a half-baked conjecture; it will be suggested, seemingly para-
doxically, that a complex economycan be formally based on the foundations of
orthodox general equilibrium theory and, hence, a similar impossibilityresult
is valid in this case, too.
I have found Duncan Foleys excellent characterisation of the objects of study
by the sciences of complexityin [6], p.2, extremely helpful in providing a base
from which to approach the study of a subject that is technically demanding,
conceptually multi-faceted and philosophically and epistemologically highly in-
homogeneous:
"Complexity theory represents an ambitious e¤ort to analyze the
functioning of highly organized but decentralized systems composed
of very large numbers of individual components. The basic processes
of life, involving the chemical interactions of thousands of proteins,
the living cell, which localizes and organizes these processes, the
human brain in which thousands of cells interact to maintain con-
sciousness, ecological systems arising from the interaction of thou-
sands of species, the processes of biological evolution from which new
species emerges, and the capitalist economy, which arises from the
interaction of millions of human individuals, each of them already a
complex entity2 , are leading examples."
[6], p.2; italics added.
These objects share:
"[A] potential to congure their component parts in an astronom-
ically large number of ways (they are complex ), constant change
in response to environmental stimulus and their own development
(they are adaptive), a strong tendency to achieve recognizable, sta-
ble patterns in their conguration (they are self-organizing), and
an avoidance of stable, self-reproducing states (they are non-
equilibrium systems). The task complexity science sets itself is the
1 I mean by e¤ective the formal sense of the word in (classical) recursion theory.
2Note Foleys interesting characterisation of each human individual in the interaction of
millions in a decentralized system as a complex entity. This is diametrically opposed to the
formalism in agent-based models of simple agents interacting to generate self-organized pat-
terns of behaviour. In these latter class of models the formalism chosen for the individual
agent abstracts away from all its realistic complex characteristics. A Turing Machine formal-
ism is the best way, in a precisely denable sense and consistent with formal economic theory,
to encapsulate the full complexities of an individual agent.
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exploration of the general properties of complex, adaptive,
self-organizing, non-equilibrium systems.
The methods of complex systems theory are highly empirical and
inductive. ... A characteristic of these ... complex systems is that
their components and rules of interactions are non-linear ... .The
computer plays a critical role in this research, because it becomes
impossible to say much directly about the dynamics of non-linear
systems with a large number of degrees of freedom using classical
mathematical analytical methods."
(ibid, p.2; bold emphasis added.)
In a similar vein, Fontana and Buss ([7]) have suggested that complexityin
a dynamical system arises as a result of the interactions between high dimen-
sionalityand non-linearity:
". . . [A] fundamental problem in methodology [is that] the tradi-
tional theory of dynamical systemsis not equipped for dealing with
constructive processes3 . . . .We seek to solve this impasse by con-
necting dynamical systems with fundamental research in computer
science . . . . . . .Many failures in domains of biological (e.g., devel-
opment), cognitive (e.g., organization of experience), social (e.g.,
institutions), and economic science (e.g., markets) are nearly uni-
versally attributed to some combination of high dimensionality and
nonlinearity. Either alone wont necessarily kill you, but just a little
of both is more than enough. This, then, is vaguely referred to as
complexity."
[7],pp.56-7; italics added.
The suggestions for a formalism of a complex economy in BC are more
specically framed in the context of a discussion of the role of policy in such
an economy. I hope the following concise summary is reasonably faithful to the
spirit of their approach and encapsulates the more imaginative ideas explicitly.
In section 2 of [3], titled How Complexity Changes EconomistsWorldview
the authors list six ways in which a complexity visionbrings about (or should
bring about) a change in the worldview that is currently dominant in policy
circles. The latter is given the imaginative representative name economic re-
porter, a person trained in one of the better and conventional graduate schools
of economics and fully equipped with the tinted glasses that such an educa-
tion provides: a worldview for policy that is underpinned by general equilibrium
theory (henceforth GET) and game theory. These are the bright young things
that go around the world seeing Nash equilibria and the two welfare theorems
in the processes that economies generate, without the slightest clue as to how
one can interpret actions, events and institutional pathologies during processes
and their frequent paralysis.
3 I do not believe this refers to constructivein the strict sense of constructive mathematics
of any variety.
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Brock and Colander, as complexity theorists, aim to take away the intel-
lectual props that these economic reporters carry as their fall-back position for
policy recommendations: general equilibrium theory and the baggage that comes
with it (although, curiously, they do not mention taking away that other prop:
game theory, which, in my opinion, is far more sinister). With this aim in mind
the six changes that a complexity visionmay bring about in the worldview of
the economic reporter, according to BC, are as follows:
 With a complexity vision the most important policy input is in institu-
tional design.
 The complexity vision brings with it an attitude of theoretical neutrality
to abstract debates about policy.
 The complexity-trained policy economistwill try to seek out the bound-
aries of the equivalent of the basins of attractions of dynamical systems -
i.e., equipped with notions of criticality and their crucial role in providing
adaptive exibilities in the face of external disturbances, the complexity
trained economist will not be complacent that any observable dynamics is
that of an elementary, characterizable, attractor.
 There will be more focus on inductive process models than on abstract
deductive models.
 Due to the paramount roles played by positive feedback underpinning path
dependence and increasing returns in the complexity visioned economist,
the attitude to policy will be honed towards a temporal dimension to it
being given crucial roles to play.
 The complexity worldview makes policy recommendations less certain sim-
ply because pattern detection is a hazardous activity and patterns are
ephemeral, eternally transient phenomena.
On the whole, then, I base my interpretation of a formal dynamical system
representing a complex economy to be underpinned by high dimensionality,
nonlinearity and congured on the boundaries of basins of attractions. However,
I wish to add three caveats to these highly suggestive and entirely plausible
elements for a characterization of a dynamical system encapsulating the essential
features of a complex economy.
The rst is the joint suggestion in Foley and in Fontana-Buss and in much of
the standard literature of the sciences of complexitythat high dimensionality
and nonlinearity are necessary ingredients for the manifestation of complex
behaviour by a formal dynamical system. I think it is quite easy to show
complex behaviour in a low dimensional, asynchronously coupled, dynamical
system, in any sense dened as desirable by the sciences of complexity.
Secondly, it is easy to show, formally, that a dynamical system must possess
the computability based property of self-reproduction for it to be capable of
self-organization.
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Thirdly, there is a di¢ culty in reconciling the three desiderata - bordering on
formal impossibility - of: institutional design, self-organization and the idea of a
dynamical system delicately poised on the boundaries of its basins of attraction.
Finally, implicit - and occasionally also explicitly - in all of the suggested
criteria for dening a dynamical system underpinning a complex economyby
the authors cited above, there is the forceful call for a shift away from the
formal methods of mathematics and philosophy of science customarily used in
economic theory and a move is advocated, by necessity if you like, towards the
study of the high dimensional, nonlinear, dynamical systems using the methods
of simulation and numerical studies based on the (digital) computer. I am in
complete agreement with this call, although not just high dimensionality and
nonlinearitycall forth this shift towards reliance on the (digital) computer, in-
duction/abduction and so on. Now, a serious acceptance of these admonitions
requires that the formalisms of dynamical systems must also be underpinned
by the mathematics of the computer - recursion theory. I am not aware of any
systematic study by the theorists, advocates and practitioners of a complexity
visionof basing their formalisms on recursion theory. Thus, there is an un-
easy and easily demonstrable dissonance between the various above mentioned
desiderata and the actual mathematical formalisms used. For example, it is
one thing to state that a dynamical system representing a complex economy
should be congured at the boundary of the basin of attraction of attractors; it
is quite another thing to make such a criterion numerically meaningful so that
it can be investigated on the (digital) computer. Of course, if one is working
with analogue computers, the complexity visioncan be kept consistent with
classical mathematical analytical methods, up to a point.
The dissonance is, however, only apparent and not real. This is because the
fact is that the new mathematical formalisms for the new sciences of complexity
came, in fact, from two very special directions, almost simultaneously: devel-
opments in the theory and numerical study of non-linear dynamical systems
and new paradigms for representing, in a computational format, ideas about
self-reproduction, self-reconstruction and self-organization in (not necessarily)
high-dimensional systems. The interpretations of the latter in terms of the the-
ory of the former and the representations of the former in terms of the paradigms
of the latter was the serendipitous outcome that gave the sciences of complexity
its most vigorous and sustained mathematical framework. The classic contri-
butions to this story are the following: [19], [21], [10], [11], [15] and [17], from
which emerged a vast, exciting and interesting work that has, in my opinion, led
to the complexity visionand the sciences of complexity. These contributions
are classics and, like all classics, are still eminently readable - they have neither
aged nor have the questions they posed become obsolete by the development of
new theoretical technologies; if anything, the new theoretical technologies have
reinforced the visions they foresaw and the scientic traditions and trends they
initiated.
Let me end these preliminaries with some remarks on policyin a complex
economy. Brock and Colander make the entirely reasonable observation that
(op.cit, p.79; italics added):
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"Much of deductive standard economic theory has been directed at
providing a general theory based on rst principles. Complexity the-
ory suggests that question may have no answer and, at this point,
the focus of abstract deductive theory should probably be on the
smaller questions - accepting that the economy is in a particular po-
sition, and talking about how policy might inuence the movement
from that position. That makes a di¤erence for policy in what one
takes as given - it suggests that existing institutions should be incor-
porated in the models, and that policy suggestions should be made
in reference to models incorporating such institutions . . . ."
Was this not, after all, the message in the General Theory? Accepting that
the economy is in a particular positionof unemployment equilibrium and de-
vising a theory for policy that would inuence movement from that position
to a more desirable position. Such a vision implied, in the General Theory, an
economy with multiple equilibria and, at the hands of a distinguished array of
nonlinear Keynesians, also that other hobby horse of the complexity visionar-
ies: positive feedback- in more conventional dynamic terms, locally unstable
equilibria in a dynamical system subject to relaxation oscillations. In addition,
in the early nonlinear Keynesian literature, when disaggregated macrodynamics
was investigated, there were coupled markets, but the mathematics required to
analyze coupled nonlinear di¤erential equations was only in its infancy and these
nonlinear Keynesians resorted to ad hoc numerical and geometric methods.
So, we are in familiar territory, but not the terrain that is usually covered
in the education of the economic reporters. To this extent Brock and Colander
are right on the mark about the policy-complexity nexus.
Were these precepts also not the credo of the pioneers of classical behav-
ioural economics: Herbert Simon, Richard Day, James March and Co? Studying
adjustment processesphenomenologically, eschewing the search for rst princi-
ples, underpinning economic theoretic closures with institutional assumptions,
enriching rationality postulates by setting agents in explicit institutional and
problem-solving contexts, seeking algorithmic foundations for behaviour4 , and
so on. Was there ever an economic agent abstracted away from an institutional
setting in any of Simons writings? Were not all of Days agents, in his dynamic
economics, behaving adaptively?
So, these precepts have a noble pedigree in classical behavioural economics
and in the economics of Keynesand it is not as if those of us who were trained
in these two traditions were not aware of the complexity-policy nexus
For over a quarter of a century I have taught macroeconomics emphasizing
the paradox of saving, referring to the Banana Paradoxin the Treatise, the
4Which, automatically, brings with it undecidabilities, uncomputabilities and other inde-
terminate problems that can only, always, be solvedpro tempore, aiming to determine the
boundaries of basins of attraction numerically, and so on. A list that not only encompasses
the Brock-Colander set of six-fold precepts but also one that is far richer in inductive content
and retroductive - i.e., abductive - realization.
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story of the origins of the classical theory of economic policy5 and the emer-
gence of the Lucasian critique as an outcome of an awareness of the paradoxes
of self-referentiality in a dynamical system capable of computation universality.
Coming to terms with the wedge that has to be designed between partsand
wholes that emerges in a macroeconomy subject to the paradox of saving,
and related paradoxes, and respecting the conundrums of self-referentiality in
underpinning it - the macroeconomy - in a system of rational individual be-
haviour, are the twin horns on which the complexity-policynexus has often
oundered. As a result the unfortunate trajectory of the theory of policy has
oscillated between adherence to a mechanical view of the feasibility of policy
and a nihilistic attitude advocating the irrelevancy of policy.
The via media that is being wisely suggested in Brock and Colander - except
for their advocacy of institution design for a complex economy - is entirely
justiable for a complex economy.
2 Undecdidability of Policy in a Complex Econ-
omy
I am not sure what Brock-Colander mean by an elementary, characterizable,
attractorsimply because the formalism for characterizabilityis not precisely
dened. I take it, however, that they mean by the phrase elementary char-
acterizable attractorthe standard limit points, limit cycles and strange(i.e.,
chaotic) attractors. As for characterizableI shall assume e¤ective character-
ization of dening basins of attraction. Then, given the observable trajectories
of a dynamical system, say computed using simple Poincarè maps or the like,
an elementary characterizable attractoris one that can be associated with a
5By the classical theory of economic policyI am referring, now, to the so-called target-
instrument approach that is usually attributed to Ragnar Frisch, Jan Tinbergen and Bent
Hansen and not the theory of policy of the classical economists. It may be useful to record
the origins of this approach (as narrated to me by Mrs Gertrud Lindahl, during personal con-
versations at her home in Lund, in 1983). In the early 1930s, the Social Democratic Minister
of Finance of a Sweden grappling, like most other economies, with the ravages wrought in the
labour market by the great depression, was Ernst Wigforss. He approached the two lead-
ing Swedish economists, Gunnar Myrdal and Erik Lindahl, both sympathtic to the political
philosophy of the Social Democrats, and requested them to provide him with a theory for
the underbalancing of the budget so that he can justify the policy measures he was plan-
ning to implement to combat unemployment due to insu¢ cent e¤ective demand. He needed
a theory, he told them, because the leader of the oppositon in that Parliament was the
Professor of Economics at Stockholm University, Gösta Bagge, who was versed only in a
theory that would justify a balanced budget. Thus was born, via the framework devised in
Myrdals famous memorandum to Wigforss ([12]), the classical theory of economic policy,
made mathematically formal, rst, by Frisch, Tinbergen and Hnsen and famously known as
the target-instrumentapproach. It was built on the essential back of the paradox of saving,
the main macroeconomic repository of the wedge between wholesand partsthat makes a
mockery of reductionism. The pioneers of macroeconomics, Keynes, Myrdal, Lindahl, Lund-
berg and others, were theorists of the complexity-policy nexus before their time - rather like
Molières famous unconscious purveyor of prose, Monsieur Jourdain.
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Finite Automaton6 . Thus, limit points, limit cycles and strange attractors are
e¤ectively characterizable in a computably trivial sense; however, dynamical
systems capable of computation universality have to be associated with Turing
Machines. Hence, trajectories that are generated by dynamical systems poised
on the boundaries of the basins of attractions of simple attractors may possess
undecidable properties due to the ubiquity of the Halting problem for Turing
Machines, the emergence of Busy Beavers (i.e., uncomputabilities), etc. Any
theory of policy, i.e., any rule - xed or discretionary - that is a function of the
values of the dynamics of an economy formalized as a dynamical system capable
of computation universality, will share these exotic properties.
I shall assume an abstract model of a complex economy, or of an economy
capable of complex behaviour, to be a dynamical system capable of compu-
tation universality. No other dynamical system would satisfy the imaginative
characterizations suggested explicitly, and by implication, by Foley and Brock-
Colander, above. I shall assume, moreover, familiarity with the formal denition
of a dynamical system (cf. for example, the obvious and accessible classic, [8] or
the more modern, [2]), the necessary associated concepts from dynamical sys-
tems theory and all the necessary notions from classical computability theory
(for which the reader can, with prot and enjoyment, go to a classic like [14]
or, at the frontiers, to [4]). Just for ease of reference the bare bones of relevant
denitions for dynamical systems are given below in the usual telegraphic form7 .
An intuitive understanding of the denition of a basin of attractionis probably
su¢ cient for a complete comprehension of the main result - provided there is
reasonable familiarity with the denition and properties of Turing Machines (or
partial recursive functions or equivalent formalisms encapsulated by Churchs
Thesis).
Denition 1 The Initial Value Problem (IVP) for an Ordinary Di¤erential
Equation (ODE) and Flows. Consider a di¤erential equation:
_x = f(x) (1)
where x is an unknown function of t 2 I (say, t : time and I an open interval
of the real line) and f is a given function of x. Then, a function x is a solution
of (1) on the open interval I if:
_x(t) = f(x(t));8t 2 I (2)
The initial value problem (ivp) for (1) is, then, stated as:
_x = f(x); x(t0) = x0 (3)
6The analogy here is like that between the Chomskey hierarchy of formal languages and
abstract computing machines. Foleys discussion of this link in [5], particularly §1.4.3, pp.
44-6, is particularly illuminating. Wolfram, in [22], developed these ideas in the direction that
I am trying to exploit here.
7 In the denition of a dynamical system given below I am not striving to present the most
general version. The basic aim is to lead to an intuitive understanding of the denition of a
basin of attraction so that the main theorem is made reasonably transparent. Moreover, the
deniton given below is for scalar ODEs, easily generalizable to the vector case.
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and a solution x(t) for (3) is referred to as a solution through x0 at t0. Denote
x(t) and x0, respectively, as:
'(t; x0)  x(t), and '(0; x0)  x0 (4)
where '(t; x0) is called the ow of _x = f(x):
Denition 2 Dynamical System
If f is a C1 function (i.e., the set of all di¤erentiable functions with con-
tinuous rst derivatives), then the ow '(t; x0);8t; induces a map of
U @ R into itself, called a C1 dynamical system on R:
x0 7 ! '(t; x0) (5)
if it satises the following (one-parameter group) properties:
1. '(0; x0) = x0
2. '(t + s; x0) = '(t; '(s; x0));8t & s; whenever both the l.h and r.h side
maps are dened;
3. 8t; '(t; x0) is a C1 map with a C1 inverse given by: '( t; x0);
Remark 3 A geometric way to think of the connection between a ow and the
induced dynamical system is to say that the ow of an ODE gives rise to a
dynamical system on R.
Remark 4 It is important to remember that the map of U @ R into itself
may not be dened on all of R. In this context, it might be useful to recall the
distinction between partial recursive functions and total functions in classical
recursion theory.
Denition 5 Invariant set
A set (usually compact) S @ U is invariant under the ow '(:; :) whenever
8t 2 R; '(:; :) @ S:
Denition 6 Attracting set
A closed invariant set A @ U is referred to as the attracting set of the
ow '(t; x) if 9 some neighbourhood V of A; s.t 8x 2 V & 8t  0; '(t; x) 2 V
and:
'(t; x)! A as t!1 (6)
Remark 7 It is important to remember that in dynamical systems theory con-
texts the attracting sets are considered the observable states of the dynamical
system and its ow.
Denition 8 The basin of attraction of the attracting set A of a ow, denoted,
say, by A, is dened to be the following set:
A = [t0't(V ) (7)
where: 't(:) denotes the ow '(:; :);8t:
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Remark 9 Intuitively, the basin of attraction of a ow is the set of initial
conditions that eventually leads to its attracting set - i.e., to its limit set (limit
points, limit cycles, strange attractors, etc). Anyone familiar with the denition
of a Turing Machine and the famous Halting problem for such machines would
immediately recognise the connection with the denition of basin of attraction
and suspect that my main result is obvious8 .
On the policy side, my formal assumption is that by policyis meant rules
and my obvious working hypothesis - almost a thesis, if not an axiom - is the
following:
Claim 10 Every rule is reducible to a recursive rule9
Remark 11 This claim and the results below are valid whether by rule is
meant an element from a set of preassigned rules (i.e., the notion of policy
as a xed rule in the rules vs. discretiondichotomy) or a rule as a (partial
recursive or total) function of the current state of the dynamics of a complex
economy (discretionay policy)10 .
Remark 12 If anyone can suggest a rule which cannot be reduced to a recursive
rule, it can only be due to an appeal to a non-algorithmic principle like an
undecidable disjunction, magic, ESP or something similar.
Denition 13 Dynamical Systems capable of Computation Universal-
ity:
A dynamical system capable of computation universality is one whose den-
ing initial conditions can be used to program and simulate the actions of any
arbitrary Turing Machine, in particular that of a Universal Turing Machine.
Proposition 14 Dynamical systems characterizable in terms of limit points,
limit cycles or chaoticattractors, called elementary attractors, are not capable
of universal computation.
Proposition 15 Only dynamical systems whose basins of attraction are poised
on the boundaries of elementary attractors are capable of universal computation.
Theorem 16 There is no e¤ective procedure to decide whether a given observ-
able trajectory is in the basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable of
computation universality
8 In the same sense in which the Walrasian Equilibrium Existence theorem is obvious for
anyone familiar with the Brouwer (or similar) xed point theorem(s). The nesse, however,
was to formalise the Walrasian economy topologically, in the rst place. A similar nesse is
required here, but space does not permit me to go into details
9Firstly, recursiveis meanto to be interpreted in its recursion theoreticsense; secondly,
this claim is, in fact, a restatement of Churchs Thesis (cf. [1], p.34).
10 It may be useful to keep in mind the follwing caveat introduced in one of the famous
papers on these matters by Kydland and Prescott ([9], p.169):
"[W]e emphasize that the choice is from a [xed] set of scal policy rules."
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Proof. The rst step in the proof is to show that the basin of attraction of a
dynamical system capable of universal computation is recursively enumerable
but not recursive. The second step, then, is to apply Rices theorem to the
problem of membership decidability in such a set.
First of all, note that the basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable
of universal computation is recursively enumerable. This is so since trajectories
belonging to such a dynamical system can be e¤ectively listed simply by trying
out, systematically, sets of appropriate initial conditions.
On the other hand, such a basin of attraction is not recursive. For, suppose
a basin of attraction of a dynamical system capable of universal computation
is recursive. Then, given arbitrary initial conditions, the Turing Machine corre-
sponding to the dynamical system capable of universal computation would be
able to answer whether (or not) it will halt at the particular conguration char-
acterising the relevant observed trajectory. This contradicts the unsolvability
of the Halting problem for Turing Machines.
Therefore, by Rices theorem, there is no e¤ective procedure to decided
whether any given arbitrary observed trajectory is in the basin of attraction
of such recursively enumerable but not recursive basin of attraction.
Given this result, it is clear that an e¤ective theory of policy is impossible
in a complex economy. Obviously, if it is e¤ectively undecidable to determine
whether an observable trajectory lies in the basin of attraction of a dynamical
system capable of computation universality, it is also impossible to devise a
policy - i.e., a recursive rule - as a function of the dening coordinates of such
an observed or observable trajectory. Just for the record I shall state it as a
formal proposition:
Proposition 17 An e¤ective theory of policy is impossible for a complex econ-
omy
Remark 18 The impossibilitymust be understood in the context of e¤ectiv-
ity and that it does not mean specic policies cannot be devised for individual
complex economies. This is similar to the fact that non-existence of general
purpose algorithms for solving arbitrary Diophantine equations does not mean
specic algorithms cannot and have not been found for special, particular, such
equations.
What if the realized trajectory lies outside the basin of attraction of a dy-
namical system capable of computation universality and the objective of policy
is to drive the system to such a basin of attraction? This means the policy
maker is trying to design a dynamical system capable of computational univer-
sality with initial conditions pertaining to one that does not have that capability.
Or, equivalently, an attempt is being made, by the policy maker, to devise a
method by which to make a Finite Automaton construct a Turing Machine, an
impossibility. In other words, an attempt is being made endogenously to con-
struct a complex economyfrom a non-complex economy. Much of this e¤ort
is, perhaps, what is called development economics or transition economics
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and I interpret the Brock-Colander remarks on institution design in this con-
text and, therefore, claim that it is recursively impossible. Essentially, my claim
is that it is recursively impossible to construct a system capable of computa-
tion universality using only the dening characteristics of a Finite Automaton.
To put it more picturesquely, a non-algorithmic step must be taken to go from
systems incapable of self-organisation to ones that are capable of it. This inter-
pretation is entirely consistent with the original denition, explicitly stated, of
an emergent propertyor an emergent phenomenon, by George Henry Lewes.
This is why developmentand transitionare di¢ cult issues to theorise about,
especially for policy purposes.
Thus, the Brock-Colander desideratum of requiring the complexity-trained
policy economistto try to seek out the boundaries of the equivalent of the basins
of attractors of dynamical systemsis a recursively undecidable task. It must,
however, be remembered that this does not mean that the task is impossible in
any absolute sense. There may well be non-recursive methods to seek out the
boundaries of the equivalent of the basins of attractors of dynamical systems.
There may also be ad hoc means by which recursive methods may be discovered
for such a task. The above theorem seeks only to state that there are no general
purpose e¤ective methods for such a policy task. Hence the admonition to
be modest about policy proposals for a complex economy given by Brock and
Colander is entirely reasonable Hence, also, when Brock-Colander hold the other
horn of the complexity worldview and warnthe complexity vision holders that
the complexity worldview makes policy recommendations less certain ...., they
are being eminently realistic and insightful, although it may well be for other
than algorithmic reasons.
3 Remarks on Generating a GETComplex Econ-
omy
Both Duncan Foley and Fontana and Buss reect accurately the intuition of
complexity theorists that a conjunction of nonlinearity and high dimensionality
(just a little of both), underpinned by adaptation (the basis for dynamics),
might be the dening criteria for the genesis of a complex adaptive dynamical
system (CADS). It is almost inevitable that the methods of classical analyti-
cal mathematical methodsare inadequate for the purposes of studying these
systems in traditional ways - i.e., looking for closed form solutions - and the com-
puter and its mathematics have to be harnessed in a serious way in the study
of CADS. The additional ad hoc criterion of choosing those dynamical systems
whose attracting sets are located on the boundaries of elementary attractors is
less compelling from a theoretical point of view, at least to this writer.
In the citadel of economic theory, General Equilibrium Theory, there is more
than a little of both, nonlinearity and high dimensionality. The general equi-
librium theorist can justiably claim that the core model has been studied with
impeccable analytical rigour, using classical mathematical analytical methods.
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Therefore, since there is so much more than just a little of both, nonlinearity
and high dimensionality, in the general equilibrium model, it must encompass
enough complexityof some sort for us to be able to endow it with a complex-
ity vision. Why, the puzzled economic theorist may ask, dont we do precisely
that, instead of building ad hoc models, without the usual micro closures 11 . On
the other hand, there are three fundamental criticisms of orthodox theory - by
which I shall understand the rigorousversion of GET and not some watered
down version in an intermediate textbook - implied by the complexity vision.
Orthodox theory is weak on processes; it is almost silent on increasing returns
technology ; it is insu¢ ciently equipped to handle disequilibria. The rst obviates
the need to consider adaptation; the second, in conjunction with the rst, rules
out positive feedback processes; and the third, again in conjunction with the
rst, circumvents the problem of the emergence of self-organised, novel, orders.
I am in substantial agreement with these fundamental criticisms. However, I do
not believe that orthodox theory has to be thrown overboard and an entirely
new closure has to be devised for the complexity visionto be encapsulated in a
dynamical system capable of computation universality to represent a complex
economy. To be fair, I should add that BC do maintain, in varying degrees
of emphasis, that the complexity visionshould be viewed as complementing
orthodox visions and they do not envisage or advocate a throwing away of the
proverbial baby with the bath water.
It is my belief that orthodox GET has been much maligned by the complexity
theorists and I would like to suggest a pathway to redress some of the mischief.
If the pathway is reasonably acceptable, then the complexity-policy nexus can
be buttressed by the fundamental theorems of welfare economics as foundations
for policy12 . Lack of space prevents me from making my case formally. I shall,
however, suggest the broad line of attack that might make the case for the
defence, so to speak. There are three elements to my pathway:
1. The Sonnenschein-Debreu-Mantel (S-D-M) ([18]) theorem on excess de-
mand functions;
2. The Uzawa Equivalence theorem ([20]) between the Walrasian Equilibrium
Existence theorem and the Brouwer xed point theorem;
3. The Pour-El and Richards theorem ([13]) on the genesis of computable
generation of a non-recursive real as the solution to the IVP of an ODE;
As a consequence of the S-D-M theorem, the only structural properties that
have to be preserved when, say, introducing ad hoc price dynamics for a general
equilibrium exchange economy are Walrass Law and continuity. This is entirely
11 I use this word closureinstead of the more loaded word microfoundationsdeliberately.
I believe the idea of the closureof neoclassical economics, i.e., based on preferences, endow-
ments and technology, is more fundamental and can be given many more foundations than
the orthodox one.
12 It must, however, be remembered that the more important of the two theorems as policy
underpinnings is the second one. On the other hand, this theorem, in its general form, relies
for its proof on the Hahn-Banach theorem, which is recursively dubious.
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compatible with the characterizations given above in dening ows of dynamical
systems. Next, the main implication of the Uzawa equivalence theorem is that
the economic equilibrium is a non-recursive real whereas the initial conditions
of the economy given by the endowments, etc., have to be recursive reals. The
question is, then, how to devise an IVP for an ODE such that for recursive reals
as inputs, a non-recursive real solution is the result. Such a ow can then be
associated with the price dynamics of a general equilibrium exchange economy
in view of the arbitrariness sanctioned by the S-D-M theorem. It is at this
point that the Pour-El and Richards construction comes into play and allows
an unusual tâtonnement to be devised such that its actions can simulate the
activities of a Turing Machine - i.e., a tâtonnement dynamics that is capable of
computation universality.
What of policy in such a GET complex economy? The only question of
policy is whether the out-of-equilibrium tâtonnement dynamics can be speeded
up towards the non-recursive real solution, while not violating the strictures
of at least the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics. Needless to
say, it is relatively easy to show that no e¤ective procedure can be devised
to achieve such speeding up. Since the frontiers of theoretical policy discus-
sions are almost entirely about driving out-of-equilibrium congurations towards
(stochastic) dynamic equilibrium paths, the bearing of such an ine¤ective result
must be obvious to any sympathetic reader. It is, however, a complete research
agenda and not an issue that can be settled with throwaway remarks at the end
of a paragraph!
4 Policy, Poetry and Political Economy
The complex economyconsidered in the previous sections did not encapsulate
any notion of emergence. Emergence, at least as dened and intended by the
pioneers, John Stuart Mill, George Henry Lewes and C Lloyd Morgan was meant
to be an intrinsically non-algorithmic concept. So, almost by denition and de-
fault, no question of policy as rules to maintain or drive trajectories of emergent
dynamical systems to desired locations in phase space is even conceivable, at
least not in any formal, e¤ective way.
Perhaps this is the reason for Hayeks lifelong scepticism on the scope for
policy in economies that emerge and form spontaneous orders! It is not for noth-
ing that Harrods growth path was on a knife-edge and Wicksells cumulative
process was a metastable dynamical system, located on the boundary dened
by the basins of attractions of two stable elementary dynamical systems (one
for the real economy, founded on a modied Austrian capital theory; the other
for a monetary macroeconomy underpinned by a pure credit system.)
When policy discussions resort to reliance on special economic models the
same unease that causes disquiet when special interests advocate policies should
be the outcome. Any number and kind of special dynamic economic models can
be devised to justify almost anything - all the way from policy nihilism, the
fashion of the day, to dogmatic insistence on rigid policies, justied on the basis
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of seemingly sophisticated, essentially ad hoc, models. Equally, studying pat-
terns by simulating complex dynamical models and inferring structures, without
grounding them on the mathematics of the computer is a dangerous pastime.
A fortiori, suggesting policy measures on the basis of such inferred structures is
doubly dangerous. Nothing in the formalism of the mathematics underlying the
digital computer, the vehicle in which such investigations are conducted, and
simulations by it, justies formal inferences on implementable e¤ective policies.
Impossibility and undecidability results do not mean paralysis. Arrows im-
possibility theorem did not mean that democratic institution design was aban-
doned forever; Sens theory of the impossibility of a Paretian liberal did not
forbid individual advocacy along lines that could only be interpreted as a phi-
losophy of a Paretian liberal; Rabins powerful result that even though there
are determined classical games, it is not possible to devise e¤ective instructions
to guide the theoretical winner to implement a winning strategy has not meant
that game theory cannot be a useful guide to policy. Similarly, the impossibility
of an e¤ective theory of policy does not mean that the poets in our profession
cannot devise enlightened policies that benet a complex economy. I can do no
better to illustrate this attitude than to repeat a Keynes storythat was told,
almost with uncharacteristic awe, by the redoubtable Bertrand Russell:
"On Sunday, August 2, 1914, I met [Keynes] hurrying across the
Great Court of Trinity. I asked him what the hurry was and he
said he wanted to borrow his brother-in-laws motorcycle to go to
London. Why dont you go by train, I said. Because there isnt
time, he replied. I did not know what his business might be, but
within a few days the bank rate, which panic-mongers had put up
to ten per cent, was reduced to ve per cent. This was his doing."
[16], pp.68-9
There are similar stories about Lindahls intuition on policy relating to the
bank rate. Keynes and Lindahl did not rely on mechanical deductions from for-
mal mathematical models of the economy. Perhaps the growth of the complexity
of economies calls forth more than intuition based on a thorough familiarity of
the institutions of an economy and its behavioural underpinnings, the kind of
familiarity a Keynes or a Lindahl possessed. There is, however, no question
that the relevant knowledge and its manifestation in policy actions could have
resulted from recursive procedures. Poetry is not an algorithmic endeavour -
either in its creation or in its appreciation; nor is policy, especially in a complex
economy.
Essentially the main message of this seemingly negative paper is that the jus-
tication for policy cannot be sought in e¤ective formalisms. One must resort
to poetry and classical political economy, i.e., rely on imagination and compas-
sion, for the visions of policies that have to be carved out to make institutions
locate themselves in those metastable congurations that are dened by the
boundaries in which dynamical systems capable of universal computation get
characterised. This is, essentially, the enlightened message that I inferred from
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the Brock-Colander discussion of policy in a complex economy, the paper which
guided my thoughts in framing the questions posed in this paper. I am not
sure the answers will be welcomed by either Brock-Colander or Foley, the other
thoughtful prop which was my inspiration for the framework and contents of
this paper.
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